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Against the "Ordinary Summing" Test for
Convergence
G. C. Gonnu

University ofRichmond

Abstract: One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing
Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive
survey of possible candidates for the linked/
convergent distinction, advocates a particular version ofYanal's test. In a recent article,
Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and
verifY Y anal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yan~' s Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that
Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not
demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary
Summing Test fails. Hence, despite Walton's
recommendation or Tyaglo 's generalization,
the Ordinary Summing Test should not be
used for distinguishing linked argument
structures from convergent argument structures.

Resume: L 'Epreuve "Ordinary Summing"
de Robert Y anal est une fayon courante de
distinguer des premisses dependantes des
premisses independantes. Dans son expose
detaille des differentes discussions sur Ia distinction entre ces premisses, Douglas Walton
plaide en faveur d'une version de l'epreuve
de Yanal. Dans un article recent, Alexander
Tyaglo propose de generaliser et de verifier
Ia methode algorithmique deY anal, qui est a
Ia base de son epreuve "Ordinary Summing".
Dans cet article j 'avance que sa methode ne
distingue pas les premisses dependantes des
premisses independantes, et done son
epreuve echoue. Par consequent, malgre Ia
recommendation de Walton ou Ia
generalisation de Tyaglo, on ne devrait pas
employer I' epreuve "Ordinary Summing"
pour differencier ces premisses.

Keywords: linked, convergent, ordinary sum, conditional probability

1. Introduction
Many, though certainly not all, introductory logic textbooks devote some attention
to argument structure and the diagramming of argument structure. In particular,
significant focus is placed on distinguishing linked argument structure from convergent argument structure. The intuition guiding the distinction is that in some
arguments some of the premises link together to form a single reason for the
conclusion, while in others the premises each constitute separate reasons which
converge on the conclusion. If the intuition grounding the distinction is sound,
then the general problem is, for any set of premises for a single conclusion, to
partition the set of premises into reasons for the conclusion. Some reasons might
be constituted by multiple premises, while others by a single premise. Unfortunately, beyond the basic intuition, the nature of the !inked/convergent distinction is
highly contentious and a quick perusal of introductory logic textbooks will gener©Informal Logic Vol. 23, No.3 (2003): pp. 215-236
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ate numerous competing and incompatible tests for partitioning the premise set
and so for determining the exact linked/convergent structure of a given argument.
One test of particular interest is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test (Yanal,
1988,1991, 2003). In Douglas Walton's comprehensive survey ofpossible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, he concludes that a particular version
of Yanal's proposed test, while not without shortcomings, is the best (Walton,
1996, 181 ). In a recent article, (Tyaglo, 2003) Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verify Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's
Ordinary Summing Test. Even the most significant criticism ofYanal's proposal,
that of David Conway, merely claims that while Yanal's test "captures as well as
possible any intuitive sense behind the notion of convergent arguments" it "doesn't
have the importance it seemed to promise" (Conway, 1991, 154). Conway does
not suggest that Yanal' s test is incorrect, but merely that if Yanal' s test is correct
it does not seem that the linked/convergent distinction is very useful.
In this paper I will argue for a claim stronger than Conway's. I will argue that
Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his
Ordinary Summing Test fails. Hence, despite Walton's recommendation or Tyaglo's
generalization, the Ordinary Summing Test should not be used for distinguishing
linked argument structures from convergent argument structures. In Section 2, I
shall present and clarify Yanal' s ordinary summing equation and his Test for making the linked/convergent distinction. In Section 3, I shall present generalized versions of Yanal's ordinary summing equation, discuss Tyaglo's "verification" of
these equations, and present some difficulties for using these generalized equations as the basis for a Generalized Ordinary Summing Test, i.e., a test that applies
to arguments with any finite number of premises, rather than just arguments with
two premises. In Section 4, I shall argue that the ordinary summing equation fails
to demarcate convergence and so Yanal's Test, and any generalization of it, fails to
successfully distinguish linked and convergent argument structures. In Section 5,
I shall (a) consider various attempts to avoid the problems of Section 4 and (b)
argue that no option succeeds. I shall conclude that despite any intuitive appeal the
test may acquire from success in some cases, the test fails in equally significant
cases and so is to be abandoned.

2. Yanal's Ordinary Summing Equation

(A)

and

Consider the following examples:
(1) She's either in the study or in the kitchen.
(2) She's not in the study.
(3) She's in the kitchen. (Yanal, 2003)
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(I) She typically goes to the kitchen around this time to make a cup of tea.

(2) I just saw her walking in the general direction of the kitchen.
(3) She's in the kitchen. (Yanal, 2003).
According to Yanal, "It is just such cases as A and B that lead us to think there
is areal distinction to be drawn" (Yanal1991, p. 137). 1
In other words, these examples are meant to be canonical examples of linked
versus convergent argument structures--examples that show that at least in some
cases we can intuitively group premises into reasons; i.e., we can recognize, independently of any test, that some premises link together to form a single reason (as
in A), whereas others are separate reasons in themselves (as in B). Given that
these examples are supposed to make us accept that there is a real distinction to be
drawn, any test of convergence that fails to demarcate the canonical examples
correctly, must be incorrect. I shall argue, in Section 4, that this is exactly what
the Ordinary Summing Test does-it fails to demarcate the canonical examples
correctly. But first I turn to stating and explicating the Ordinary Summing Test for
convergence.
According to Yanal, "The probability of the conclusion of an argument with
independent premises is the ordinary sum of the probability of each premise. The
probability of the conclusion of an argument with dependent premises is not the
ordinary sum ofthe probability of each premise" (Yanal, 1991, 140). "The probability of conclusions from arguments whose premises are dependent jumps beyond the ordinary sum of these premises" ( 140). Other than a slight terminological
change, Yanal's recent formulation is effectively the same:
Convergent arguments have premises whose probabilities sum in the ordinary way. Linked arguments have premises whose probabilities don't sum in
the ordinary way. Linked arguments have reasons that ')ump" ordinary probability sums (2003, 3-4).

But exactly what probabilities are being summed and what is it for them to sum
"ordinarily"?
Consider first Yanal's descriptions of what he calls Ordinary Summing. Concerning a non-specific example, PI, P2, therefore C. He writes:
Suppose PI in itself lends 0.3 probability to C. Suppose P2 in itself lends 0.4
probability to C .... We can think of the ordinary sum of the probabilities this
way. The probability ofC given PI is 0.3. Take 0.3 from 1.0 leaving 0.7. Call 0.7
"what is unknown." When P2 is brought in, we know 0.4 of0.7, or 0.4 x 0.7,
which is 0.28 ·more than we knew before. In sum we know the conclusion C
with 0.58 probability ( 0.3 + 0.28) (1991, 140).

Concerning argument (B), Yanal writes:
Suppose that 4 out of 5 days she goes to the kitchen at this time to make tea.
Then that premise confers on its conclusion a probability of 0.8. Now there is
a remainder uncertainty of 0.2 of whether she's in the kitchen now. The
second premise, that I've seen her walking in the direction of the kitchen,
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removes some of that uncertainty. Suppose that I'm generally right about
what I see-say 75% of the time. Then we can say that the second premise
reduces the uncertainty by 75%, or 0.75 times 0.2, which is 0.15 ..... We're
then entitled to add the probabilities of the two premises, 0.8 + 0.15, and see
that our two premises support the conclusion with a probability of0.95. We'll
call this the ordinary way of summing probabilities (2003, 3).

So what probabilities are being summed in the case of Ordinary Summing? In
Yanal's examples it is the probability that each premise "lends to" or "confers on"
the conclusion. Hence, despite the fact that Yanal describes his tests for linked/
convergent arguments in terms of "premises whose probabilities sum in the ordinary way", it is not the probabilities of the premises that are being summed, but
rather the conditional probabilities of the conclusion given each premise. After all,
it is our uncertainty concerning the conclusion that is being removed by each
premise.
So what exactly is the ordinary sum of the relevant conditional probabilities?
Suppose you have two premises PI and P2 and a conclusion C. Let the probability
ofC given PI, i.e., pr(C/PI ), be pr, and the probability ofC given P2, i.e., pr(CjP2),
be pr2 • Designate os,. 2 the ordinary sum of two conditional probabilities, pr, and
pr2 • In Yanal's manner of speaking the ordinary sum of two conditional probabilities is just (a) the degree of uncertainty relative to C removed by PI added to (b)
the degree of uncertainty relative to C removed by P2 from whatever uncertainty
is left over from that removed by Pl. In algebraic terms:

Put another way, os 1. 2 = (pr, + pr)- pr1 pr2 ; i.e., add the percentage of cases in
which PI makes C true to the percentage of cases in which P2 makes C true and
subtract once the percentage of cases in which both PI and P2 make C true, for
otherwise those cases are being double counted.
What is the relevance of the ordinary sum? Let the probability ofC given both
PI and P2; i.e., pr(C/PI & P2), be pru In very specific circumstances, pr12 is
equal to os 1 2 • In other words, the conditional probability of the conclusion given
both premises is equal to the ordinary sum of the conditional probabilities of the
conclusion given each premise separately.
Accordingly, if the probability of the conclusion given the premises is the ordinary sum of the relevant conditional probabilities, then Yanal says the argument is
convergent. If the probability of the conclusion given the premises "jumps beyond" the ordinary sum, then the argument is linked. For now let us assume that
by "jumps beyond" Yanal merely means "is greater than" (though this assumption
will be examined in greater detail in Section 4 below). In this case, we have the
following test for distinguishing linked and convergent structures, at least for twopremise arguments:
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The Ordinary Summing Test: For any argument with exactly two
premises, the argument is convergent iffpr 1 2 = os 1 2 , and the argument
is linked iff pr1 2 > os 1 2 •
•
.
Hence, given the test, if we discover that pr1 2 = os 1 2 , then the two premises are
each separate reasons for the conclusion, but if pr; 2 > os 12 then the argument
consists of a single reason for the conclusion and this single.reason is constituted
by both premises together.

3. On Generalizing the Ordinary Summing Test
As currently stated, the Ordinary Summing Test is applicable only to two premise
arguments. Can the Test be generalized to apply to arguments with more than two
premises? Presumably, the first thing we require is a generalized ordinary summing formula-a formula for determining the ordinary sum in cases requiring
summing more than two conditional probabilities. Following Yanal' stalk of eliminating uncertainty, generalizing the ordinary summing formula is straightforward.
Suppose we have three premises, PI, P2, and P3 and a conclusion C such that pr 1
= 0.6, pr2 = 0.5, and pr 3 = 0.7. What then is the ordinary sum of these three
conditional probabilities, i.e., what is os 1 2 3? Speaking with Yanal, PI removes 0.6
of the uncertainty; of the remaining 0.4 uncertainty P2 removes 1/2, or. 0.2; of the
remaining 0.2 uncertainty P3 removes 7II 0 or 0.14, leaving only an uncertainty of
0.06. Hence, the ordinary sum of the three conditional probabilities is 0.6 + 0.2 +
0.14, or 0.94.
Put as an equation, the formula for three premises is:

Generalizing further, the equation for n > 2 premises is,

osu. ·" = pr1 +(I - pr)pr2 + ... + (1-pr)(I - pr) ... (I - pr,)pr,.
In other words, no matter how many premises, start with the conditional probability of the first premise; add to that the amount of uncertainty that the second
premise removes from the uncertainty left by the first premise; add to that the
amount of uncertainty that the third premise removes from what is left by the first
and second premises; keep repeating the process until all premises have been
accounted for.
Alternatively, given that os 1. 2 = pr 1 +(I- pr) pr2 and that pr 1 +(I- pr) pr 2 is
part of the equation for os 1 2 3 , we can define the ordinary sum for arguments with
three or more premises recursively as follows:

G. C. Goddu
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and
OS

1,2, ... ,11

= OS /,2, ... ,n-1

+ (1 -

OS

J,l, ... ,n-1

)

prn.

Ignoring different, though in my view unfortunate 2 , notational choices, it is these
recursively defined generalizations ofYanal's original equation that, along with the
original equation, Alexander Tyaglo claims "to verify" by showing that they satisfy
four "natural essential conditions" (Tyaglo, 2003, 65).
Tyaglo's "natural" and "essential" conditions are as follows:
C 1: For any set of premises, the ordinary sum lies between 0 and 1.
C2: For any set of premises, the ordinary sum will be the same regardless of
the order in which the relevant conditional probabilities are summed.
C3: For any set of premises such that the probability of C given some premise
in the set is 1, the ordinary sum will be 1.
C4: For any set of premises such that the probability of C given one of those
premises is 0, the ordinary sum of the entire set will be the same as the
ordinary sum without that premise (Tyaglo, 2003, 65).

Though Tyaglo does not offer a rigorous proof, he correctly claims that the ordinary summing equations satisfy these conditions. Indeed, intuitively the ordinary
summing equations should satisfy these conditions. For example, given that (i) no
conditional probability is less than 0 and greater than 1, (ii) the initial uncertainty
can be at most 1, and (iii) each premise is removing, at most, some of whatever
uncertainty remains, the ordinary sum must be between 0 and 1, and so intuitively
the ordinary summing equations satisfy C 1. C2 just mandates that the order of the
removing of uncertainty is irrelevant to the final result. In addition, any premise
that is sufficient for the conclusion and so confers a probability of 1 on the conclusion will remove all remaining uncertainty. As a result, as C3 requires, the
ordinary sum will be 1 and none of the remaining premises will alter the ordinary
sum for there is no uncertainty left for them to remove. Finally, since any premise
that confers 0 probability on the conclusion removes none of the uncertainty, it
will have no bearing on the ordinary sum, as C4 stipulates.
Suppose we grant, even without rigorous proof, that the ordinary summing
equations satisfy Tyaglo's four conditions. In what sense though, if any, should
we grant that satisfying these conditions "verifies" the ordinary summing equations, or more significantly, the Ordinary Summing Test? At most we should grant
that satisfying these conditions shows that the ordinary summing equations meet
some basic requirements for a coherent probability calculus; i.e., the probabilities
must all be between 0 and 1, and so since we are summing, order does not matter;
once we get to 1 we can go no higher, and adding 0 does not alter the sum. But
while failing to satisfy the basic requirements of a coherent probability calculus
would indeed be a problem, satisfying these requirements does not thereby show
that the ordinary summing equations are adequate for their proposed function of
underpinning a test for distinguishing convergent from linked argument struc-
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1ures. Indeed, the relevant "verification" we require is that ordinary summing is in
fact a correct indicator of convergent argument structures, and nothing Tyaglo
offers shows that. Hence, for all the "verification" Tyaglo has given, it could turn
out that the ordinary summing equations satisfy the basic requirements of a coherent probability calculus, but fail to accurately demarcate convergent argument
structures.
In Section 4 below, I will argue that not only could it turn out this way, but that
it in fact does turn out that even though the ordinary summing equations satisfy
Tyaglo's "natural" and "essential" conditions, they do not satisfy the most essential condition of accurately demarcating convergence. First, however, I shall demonstrate that even with the generalized ordinary summing equations in hand, articulating a satisfactory Generalized Ordinary Summing Test is not a simple or
obvious generalization of the Ordinary Summing Test. Indeed, the case of just
three premises poses significant questions concerning exactly what ordinary summing demarcates.
Given the generalized ordinary summing equations, how might we go about
generalizing the Ordinary Summing Test? One natural proposal replaces pr u with
pr1. . and os 1.2 with os 1. ,II· The resulting test is,
Generalized Ordinary Summing Test 1: For any argument with n
premises, the argument is convergent iffpr1.
os 1. ,II; the argument is
linked iffpr /, ... ,11 > os 1, ... ,11 .
According to Generalized Test I, if we discover that the actual conditional
probability of the conclusion given all the premises is equal to the ordinary sum of
the conditional probabilities of the conclusion given each premise individually, then
the argument must be convergent. If the actual conditional probability is greater
than the ordinary sum, then the argument must be linked. Unfortunately, this natural proposal can easily be shown to be inadequate.
When the number of premises, n, equals two, there are exactly two ways of
partitioning the premises into reasons for a conclusion. Letting{,} group premises
into distinct reasons, the two possible patterns are:
(i) {PI, P2}
and
(ii) {PI} and {P2}.
In other words, either the two premises link to form a single reason or each
premise is a reason in its own right. When n = 2, the Generalized Ordinary Summing Test just is the Ordinary Summing Test, so if pr 1. 2 = osu, then the correct
grouping of premises is the second and the argument structure is convergent, but
if pr 1 2 > os 1 2, then the correct grouping of premises is the former and the premises
are li.nked. So far so good.
,II

,II=

But when n = 3 there are, assuming premises cannot be part of more than
one reason, five possible patterns, viz.:
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(i) {PI, P2, P3}
(ii) {PI} and {P2, P3}
(iii) {P2} and {PI, P3}

(iv) {PI, P2} and {P3}
(v) {PI} and {P2} and {P3}.
Pattern (i) we might say represents a pure linked structure, for all the premises are
linked to form a single reason, whereas pattern (v) represents a pure convergent
structure since each premise is its own individual reason. Patterns (ii}--(iv), on the
other hand, we might say all represent impure linked and convergent structures, or
hybrid structures; i.e., structures where (a) some, but not all of the premises link
into single reasons, and (b) there are at least two reasons that converge on the
conclusion. In other words, hybrid structures involve both premise linkage and
premise or reason convergence. 3
Right away there is a problem. Generalized Test I only demarcates two sorts
of structures, viz., convergent and linked. Yet for any n > 2, there will be at least
three kinds of structures; viz., purely convergent, purely linked, and hybrid. Hence,
Test I cannot by itselfbe used to determine for any argument structure whether it
is purely convergent, purely linked, or hybrid. At the very least then, Test I requires
refining in order to be an adequate demarcation test for arguments with three or
more premises.
How might such a refinement proceed? Given the alleged significance of ordinary summing, determining which, if any, of the five possible patterns are indicated whenpr 12 3 = os 12 3 seems an appropriate starting point. Since ordinary summing is suppo'sed to correspond with convergence, there are three reasonable
possibilities for what pr12 3 equaling os 12 3 demarcates: (a) pure convergence alone,
i.e., pattern (v) only; (b) impure conve'rgence alone, i.e., one of patterns (ii}--(iv)
only; 4 or (c) convergence, either pure or impure, i.e., one of patterns (ii}--(v).
Based on our intuitions about how ordinary summing works, especially the
fact that the order in which we sum the conditional probabilities does not matter,
one might suspect that ordinary summing demarcates pure convergence. If the
order of ordinary summing does not matter, then the premises must, seemingly, be
all independent of each other such that none of the premises are linked with any of
the others, and so ordinary summing must, seemingly, demarcate pure convergence. Indeed, in most cases, if pr1.2 .3 = os 1.2 .3 the pattern cannot be hybrid, and,
assuming it is not purely linked, must therefore be purely convergent. In particular, it can be shown that if no single premise is alone sufficient for the conclusion,
then if pr1 2 3 = os 12 3, the pattern cannot be hybrid. [For a full proof of this claim,
see Appendix om;]·. Unfortunately, it is not universally true that ifpr 1. 2. 3 = os 1. 2. 3 the
pattern cannot be hybrid.
To see this, suppose that pr1 = I. Hence, given that one of the premises is alone
sufficient for the conclusion, according to C3, no other premises have any bearing
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on the ordinary sum and os 1. 2.3 = 1. But ifpr 1 = 1, then the actual probability of the
conclusion given all the premises, viz., pr1. 2.3 must also be 1. Hence, pr1. 2.3 = os 1. 2.3 •
But now consider P2 and P3 and assume that at least the Ordinary Summing Test
is adequate. Either pr2 3 = os 2 3 , or it doesn't. If it does, then P2 and P3 must be
convergent, in which case, given that the whole argument is convergent, the pattern must be the purely convergent one or (v). If not, then, supposing pr2 3 > o 2 3 ,
P2 and P3 are linked and so the pattern must be the hybrid pattern (ii). Hence, ·if
one of the premises is alone sufficient for the conclusion, thenpr 12 3 equaling os 12 3
cannot distinguish whether the argument is an example of pattern (v) or one 'of
(ii)-(iv).
Suppose, based on the fact that if all we know is that pr 1 2 3 = os 12 3 then the
argument could be either purely convergent or hybrid, we refine Generalized Test
1 as follows:
Generalized Ordinary Summing Test 2: For any argument with n
premises, the argument is purely convergent or hybrid iffpr I .... ,ll = os I .... ,ll'
and the argument is purely linked iff pr1. ,II> os I .... ,ll·
Test 2, however, fares no better than Test 1, for both biconditionals of Test 2 are
demonstrably false.
To see this consider the following two arguments:
(C) (1) Either she is in the kitchen, the study or the bedroom.
(2) She is not in the study.
(3) She is not in the bedroom.
(4) She is in the kitchen.
and
(D) (1) Either she is in the kitchen, the study, or the bedroom.
(2) She is neither in the study nor the bedroom.
(3) She typically goes to the kitchen around this time to make a cup of tea.
( 4) She is in the kitchen.
Intuitively, (C) has a purely linked structure, whereas (D) has a hybrid structure in
which PI and P2 are linked, but P3 is its own separate reason. Both arguments are
deductively valid so pr 1 2 3 = 1. In neither argument is a single premise sufficient for
the conclusion, so in both cases os 123 < 1. [See Appendix Two.] Hence, in both
cases pr1•2•3 > os 1. 2.J" Since (D) is hybrid, but pr 1. 2.3 > os 1. 2.3 , it is not true that an
argument is purely linked iff pr12 3 > os 12 rAt the same time, since (D) is hybrid,
according to the first biconditio.nal of Test 2, (D) ought to be such that pr I,,2 3 =
os 1. 2.3 • But since pr1. 2. 3 > os 1. 2. 3 , the first biconditional of Test 2 is also false.
More generally, what the faults with Tests 1 and 2 show is that merely knowing that pr 1 2 3 = os 1 2 3 or pr 1 2 3 > os 1 2 3 is insufficient for being able to demarcate any
of the three. possil:ife structures. The best we might be able to do is know that if
pr 1. 2. 3 > os 1. 2. 3 , then the argument is not purely convergent and if pr1,2,3 = os 1,2,3 , then
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the argument is not purely linked. But merely knowing that an argument is not
purely linked or not purely convergent leaves open too many possibilities regarding
its actual structure. Indeed, the problem will only get worse as the number of
premises increases and so the number of non-equivalent hybrid cases increases.
Regardless, perhaps the generalized ordinary summing equations can be supplemented with, or perhaps even supplanted by, further ordinary summing calculations in order to successfully demarcate each argument structure. For example,
in the case of three premise arguments the following two options might seem
worth pursuing.
Option 1. Compare the values of pr 1 2' pr 1 3 , and pr2 3 with those of os 1 2 , os 1 3,
and os 2 3 respectively. Hypothesize that a three premise argument is (a)· pureiy
convergent iff for all three pairs prx,y = osx,y ; (b) hybrid iff for exactly one pair prx,y
> osl j (that will be the linked pair); and (c) purely linked iff for all three pairs pr~
>OS

x.y

.

Option 2. Determine the ordinary sums of each of the following pairs of conditional probabilities: (i) pru and pr3 ; (ii) pr 1•3 and pr2 ; and (iii) pr2.3 and prr In
effect this is treating each three-premise argument as a two-premise argument in
which one premise is the conjunction of two of the original premises. Hypothesize
that a three-premise argument is (a) purely convergent iff for all three pairs the
ordinary sum= pr 1 2 3 ; (b) hybrid iff for exactly one pair the ordinary sum= pr 1 2 3;
and (c) purely linked iff for all three pairs pr 1.2. 3 > the ordinary sum.
··
Notice that both of the options rely heavily on the success of the Ordinary
Summing Test; i.e., that the ordinary sum of a pair of conditional probabilities
equaling the appropriate actual conditional probability demarcates convergence. I
suspect that as the number of premises increases and so the number of nonequivalent structures requiring demarcation increases, more and more reliance will
have to be placed on calculating the sums of an increasing number of pairs of
conditional probabilities. Hence, given this reliance, if ordinary summing fails to
demarcate convergence in the two-premise case, then no test based on ordinary
summing will adequately distinguish convergent from linked structures. In the
next section I intend to demonstrate that Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test fails to
demarcate convergence, and so the prospects for determining argument structure
based on the ordinary summing equations are bleak indeed.
To summarize the main points of this section, firstly, Alexander Tyaglo's "verification" of the generalized ordinary summing equations fails to verify the most
important condition, i.e., that ordinary summing demarcates convergence. Secondly, while generalizing Yanal's original ordinary summing equation is relatively
straightforward, adequately generalizing the test for convergence based on the
ordinary summing equations is not. Thirdly, merely utilizing the appropriate ordinary summing equation based on how many premises an argument involves will
not be sufficient for determining the argument's structure. Most likely, further
appeals to the ordinary sums of pairs of conditional probabilities will be required.
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Hence, knowing whether Yanal's original ordinary summing equation demarcates
convergence is essential for determining the prospects of any Generalized Ordinary Summing Test. I tum, then, to a critical examination ofYanal's basic Ordinary Summing Test.

4. Incorrect Classification of Arguments
My strategy in this section will be to argue that the Ordinary Summing Test
classifies argument (B) incorrectly. Since (B), viz.:
(1) She typically goes to the kitchen around this time to make a cup
of tea.
(2) I just saw her walking in the general direction of the kitchen.
(3) She's in the kitchen
is supposed to be obviously or pre-theoretically convergent, if the Test classifies
(B) incorrectly, then whatever property ordinary summing demarcates, it is not
convergence.
Consider first the following argument:
(E) (1) AI shot at the target.
(2) Bob shot at the target.
(3) Therefore the target was hit.
Suppose that the probability that the target was hit given that AI shot at it is 0.9 and
the probability that it was hit given that Bob shot at it was 0.8. So in 0.9 of the
cases AI hits the target and in 0.8 Bob hits the target. Assuming that AI 's hitting the
target is stochastically independent of Bob's hitting the target, in 0.9 multiplied by
0.8 ofthe cases, or 0.72, they both hit the target. Hence, the ordinary sum probability that the target was hit is, 0.9 + 0.8- 0.72, or 1.7- 0.72, or 0.98. Assuming
that the conclusion is equivalent to "the target was hit by AI or the target was hit by
Bob", then the actual support PI and P2 provide to C in this case is indeed 0.98.
Hence, according to Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test (E) is convergent. I suspect
this result matches our intuitions, for (E), like (B), appears to be a canonical
example of a convergent argument.
But now consider another apparently canonical convergent argument:
(F) (1) The mail was delivered today.
(2) Tom went to work.
(3) It is a weekday.
Suppose the mail is delivered on all days but Sunday, regardless of holidays. Hence,
the probability of the conclusion given the first premise is 5/6 or 0.83. Suppose
Tom ultimately works five out of seven days, but 30% of his days off are weekdays and 70% weekends. In addition, given that Tom is off, no weekday is more
probable than any other and neither day of the weekend is more probable than the
other. In this case P2 makes it 0.88 probable that it is a weekday. To see this,
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consider 100 weeks or 700 days. Tom goes to work 500 days. Of the 200 days he
does not go to work, 70% or 140, are weekend days and either Saturday or
Sunday is equally likely. Hence, he does not go to work 70 Saturdays and 70
Sundays. Hence, he goes to work on 30 Saturdays and 30 Sundays. Of the 200
days he does not go to work, 30% or 60 are weekdays, and each weekday is
equally likely. Hence, he does not go to work on I2 Mondays, 12 Tuesdays, etc.
Hence, he does go to work 88 days of each weekday. Hence, given that he goes to
work, the probability that it is a weekday is 440/500 or 0.88.
The ordinary sum of0.83 and 0.88 is 0.83 + (1- 0.83)0.88 or 0.83 + (0.17)0.88
or 0.83 + O.I496 or approximately 0.98. The actual conditional probability is the
percentage of cases in which it is a weekday given that both the mail came and
Tom went to work. The mail comes and Tom goes to work on 470 days; 440
weekdays and 30 Saturdays. Hence, the actual probability is 440/470 or approximately 0.936. Hence, the actual support is less than the ordinary sum.
According to the Ordinary Summing Test, an argument is convergent iff the
actual conditional probability is equal to the ordinary sum and linked if.fthe actual
conditional probability is greater than the ordinary sum. But despite (F)'s canonical
appearance, the actual conditional probability is less than the ordinary sum. Hence,
according to the Ordinary Summing Test (F) is neither linked nor convergent.
But how can (F) be neither? How can it be that the reasons (F) provides for its
conclusion are neither (i) {PI} and {P2} separately, nor (ii) the single reason {PI,
P2}? Perhaps single premises can be parts of more than one reason such that in
the two premise case we need to consider not just patterns (i) and (ii), but also
(iii) {PI} and {PI, P2} and (iv) {PI, P2} and {P2}. But neither new pattern
succeeds either, since both require summing the actual conditional probability of
the argument, viz.,pr 1.r withpr1 or pr2 • Butpru = 0.936 andpr 1 andpr 2 are both
greater than 0. Hence the ordinary sum of pru and either pr 1 or pr2 must still be
greater than 0.936. In addition, both (iii) and (iv) involve a reason in which PI and
P2 are linked, yet since pr 1 2 < os 1 2 according to the Test, PI and P2 are not linked.
I can see no other possibilities for partitioning the premises of two premise arguments into reasons. Hence, according to the Ordinary Summing Test, the premises
of (F) cannot be partitioned into reasons, and (F) has no reasons structure at all.
But that is absurd, so the Ordinary Summing Test must be mistaken.
(E) satisfies the Test, but (F) does not, even though, intuitively, both seem
convergent. Yanal's canonical example of a convergent argument, viz., (B) also
seems convergent, but is it really or is it another example like (F)? Consider I 00
cases in which it is her typical kitchen time. Given Yanal's proposed probability, in
80 such cases she will be in the kitchen and in 20 she will not. Now suppose in all
I 00 of those cases I was present to view her movements just prior to her arriving
at her destination. Given that according to Yanal I am correct about what I see
75% of the time, in 60 of the 80 cases in which she is in the kitchen, I will have
seen her heading for the kitchen. In I5 of the 20 of the cases in which she is not
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in kitchen I will not have seen her heading to the kitchen. In the remaining five
cases in which she is not in the kitchen, I will have seen her heading for the
kitchen. 5 Hence, in 65 cases it is both kitchen time and I saw her heading that way,
but in only 60 of them, or just under 93%, will she be in the kitchen. But as Yanal
correctly points out, the ordinary sum in this case is 0.95. Hence, the actual support in (B) is not the ordinary sum, and so, contra Yanal, according to his own
Ordinary Summing Test, (B) is not convergent.
Indeed, according to the Ordinary Summing Test, (B), like (F), has no reasons
structure. Hence, far from being a canonical convergent argument-an argument
that when compared with arguments like (A) makes us think there truly is a linked/
convergent distinction-{B) seems to be no kind of argument at all. But given the
choice between rejecting the Ordinary Summing Test or affirming that the premises
of (B) cannot be partitioned into reasons and that (B) has no reasons structure, I
suspect most will opt for rejecting the Ordinary Summing Test, at least in its
current form. After all, even knowing in the case of (B) that the actual conditional
probability is less than the ordinary sum does nothing, for most people I suspect,
to allay the strong pre-theoretic intuition that (B) is an exemplar convergent argument. Regardless, before examining ways in which an advocate of using ordinary
sums might modify the Ordinary Summing Test, I shall briefly explore what the
ordinary sum being equivalent to the actual conditional probability in fact demarcates.
When discussing the relevance of the ordinary sum in section 2 of this paper,
I said that in very specific circumstances the conditional probability of the conclusion given both premises is equal to the ordinary sum of the conditional probabilities of the conclusion given each premise separately. But what exactly are those
circumstances? os J. 2 is just prJ+ (I - pr) pr2 , which I also pointed out is the same
as prJ+ pr2 - prJpr2 • Notice, however, that this latter equation is in fact a particular
case of the general disjunction rule for probabilities. Given that xis the probability
ofP andy the probability ofQ, then Pr(P v Q), assuming P and Q are stochastically
independent, is (x + y)- xy. 6
So now reconsider (E), for which the ordinary sum equals the actual conditional probability. Firstly, the conclusion of(E) is, in the circumstances, equivalent
to the disjunction "AI hits the target or Bob hits the target." By the disjunction rule
then, the probability of the conclusion is just the probability that AI hits the target
added to the probability that Bob hits the target minus the probability that they both
hit the target. Secondly, the probability that AI hits the target just is the probability
that AI hits the target given that AI shoots at the target, i.e., prJ and likewise the
probability that Bob hits the target just is the probability that Bob hits the target
given that he shoots at it, i.e., prr Finally, on the plausible supposition that AI 's rate
of success is independent of Bob's shooting at the target and Bob's rate of success
is independent of AI' s shooting at the target, then "AI hits the target" is stochastically
independent of "Bob hits the target". Hence the probability that they both hit the
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target is just the probability that AI hits the target multiplied by the probability that
Bob hits the target. Hence, the probability of the conclusion given the premises in
the case of (E) is ( pr1 + pr2 ) - pr1 pr 2, i.e., the ordinary sum.
In the cases of (B) and (F), however, neither conclusion is equivalent to a
relevant disjunction, i.e., a disjunction in which the probability of each disjunct
depends entirely on distinct premises in such a way that the disjuncts are
stochastically independent. In addition, in the case of (E) it makes perfect sense to
consider 100 cases in which both AI and Bob shot at the target, and to say that in
90 of those cases the target was hit because AI hit it and in 80 the target was hit
because Bob hit it (and, by the way, in 72 cases the target was hit because both hit
it). But in the case of (B), for example, it makes no sense to consider 100 cases in
which it's both kitchen time and I saw her heading that way, and to say that in 80
of those cases she was there because it was kitchen time and in 75 because I saw
her. The difference, I take it, is that in the case of(E) the premises are probabilistic
causes ofthe conclusion, whereas in (B) and (F) the premises are merely probabilistic
indicators of the conclusion. Regardless, the separation of cases required for appropriately applying the disjunction rule is not possible in the case of either (B) or
(F), and so the actual probability of the conclusion given the premises is not
determined by calculating the ordinary sum.
In fact, I suspect that very few arguments will satisfy the conditions required
for an appropriate application of the disjunction rule and so very few arguments
will satisfy the Ordinary Summing Test-certainly far fewer than most proponents of the linked/convergent distinction would traditionally classify as convergent. Given that the Ordinary Summing Test classifies so few arguments as convergent, even rejecting arguments that appear canonically convergent, and that
according to the Ordinary Summing Test, many very straightforward looking arguments turn out to have no reasons structure at all, the Ordinary Summing Test,
as it now stands, is to be rejected. But perhaps the Ordinary Summing Test can be
modified to avoid these problematic consequences. I turn to examining some possible modifications next.

5. Revised Ordinary Summing Tests
Both (B) and (F) appear convergent and in both the actual support is less than the
ordinary sum. Hence, neither (B) nor (F) violate what Yanal says indicates linked
arguments, viz., the actual support jumps the ordinary sum. Perhaps, then, an
advocate of the utility of ordinary summing can hold that in convergent arguments
the actual support is equal to or less than the ordinary sum, while in linked arguments the actual support is greater than the ordinary sum and so simply revise the
Ordinary Summing Test as follows:
Ordinary Summing Test A: For any argument with exactly two
premises, the argument is convergent iffpru #os 1. 2, and the argument is
linked iffpr1.2 > os 1.r

Against the "Ordinary Summing" Test for Convergence

229

Test A clearly solves the problem of arguments having no structure at all, since for
any argument the actual probability must be either greater than the ordinary sum or
less than or equal to the ordinary sum. But, assuming that (B) and (F) are canonically convergent, then Test A is also problematic, for it also misclassifies arguments.
Consider (F) again, but in the following circumstances: Tom works six days
out of seven instead of five out of seven; all his days off are weekend days; and he
works only one Saturday in 100. Given, then, that Tom went to work, the probability that it is a weekday must be 5/6 or roughly 0.83. At the same time, given the
mail came it is still 0.83 likely that it is a weekday. In this case, the ordinary sum of
(F) is 0.83 + 0.83(0.17), or 0.9711. But given that Tom works only on one Saturday in 100, the only days on which both Tom goes to work and the mail comes are
all the weekdays and one Saturday out of 100. But then the actual strength is 500/
501 or 0.998. Hence, in this case Test A would judge (F) to be linked, when it is
canonically convergent.
But perhaps an advocate of Test A will argue as follows, (B) and (F) are both
canonically convergent such that when compared with argument (A), since arguments (B) and (F) are in the vast majority of circumstances convergent, either (B)
or (F) is sufficient to make it clear that there is a distinction to be made. At the
same time, this does not mean that (B) and (F) are always convergent. In some
circumstances, like the one sketched above, (F) is linked despite the fact that in
most circumstances it is convergent. Indeed, for many generally convergent arguments it may be possible to construct situations in which the argument is linked.
There are several problems with this proposal. Firstly, it assumes that in the
majority of cases (B) and (F) are in fact convergent. But is it really true that on the
vast majority of possible arrangements of Tom working and the mail coming, (F)
turns out to be convergent? As we shall see below, there are plenty of possible
circumstances such that (F), according to the Test, comes out linked. Secondly, it
grants that even canonically convergent arguments are sometimes linked. But
while it might be plausible to hold that certain problematic arguments are problematic precisely because in some circumstances these arguments are linked, but in
others they are convergent, is it plausible to hold that canonically convergent arguments-arguments that are obviously or pre-theoretically convergent-can also
be linked? Thirdly, the proposal requires a piecemeal acceptance of our intuitions
concerning the linked/convergent distinction. Firstly, our intuitions concerning the
difference between (A) and (B), or (A) and (F) are what motivate the linked/
convergent distinction in the first place. Secondly, finding out that in one circumstance the ordinary sum is greater than the actual probability, but that in another
circumstance less, does not change our intuitions concerning whether (B) or (F)
is linked or convergent, whether the arguer is offering two reasons or one. But if
we accept Test A's results that (B) and (F) are sometimes linked and sometimes
convergent, we need to give up the second intuition. But if our intuitions concern-
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ing (B) and (F) need to be given up, how can we trust our initial intuitions concerning the difference between (A) and (B), or (A) and (F)? But if we give up the
first intuition as well, then the whole reason for the Test disappears. So the proposal requires us to keep the first intuition, but not the second, in order not to be
self-defeating. But given that we accept the first intuition, what possible reason
could be given for accepting the results of the Test over our second intuition,
rather than the other way around?
The key problem for Test A is that it allows canonically convergent arguments,
at least in some circumstances, to be linked. Assume for the moment that we are
unwilling to accept this consequence. How might we modify Test A to avoid
making our canonical arguments turn out to be both convergent and linked? Perhaps we should not interpret "jumps" as simply "greater than", but rather as "much
greater than" or "significantly greater than". 7 For example, as Yanal points out, in
a quite reasonable set of circumstances the ordinary sum of (A) is 0.55 whereas
the actual probability is 1. The jump from 0.55 is clearly a significant jump, whereas
the increase from 0. 9711 to 0. 998 apparently is not. Hence, an advocate of using
ordinary summing might advocate:
Ordinary Summing Test B: For any argument with exactly two
premises, the argument is linked if pru is significantly greater than os j_ 2
and otherwise convergent.
Test B is the version ofYanal's test that Walton (1996, 181-82) advocates. 8
Clearly one significant question for advocates of Test B, is exactly how much
greater is significant. Walton recognizes the importance of this question, but admits that no clear answer has been given (Walton, 1996, 135, 165-166).
Let us suppose for the moment that a universally uniform answer is possible.
For example, perhaps, for all arguments, a jump is significant iff it is a jump of
0.25 or greater. Unfortunately, regardless of what fixed value is deemed the minimum to count as significant, Test B will either misclassify canonical arguments or
classify one and the same canonical argument as linked in some circumstances
and convergent in other circumstances.
Reconsider (F) yet again, but in the following circumstances. The mail comes
only twice a week, on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Hence, prj= 0.5. Tom goes to
work on every Sunday, but only one day out of 100 for each weekday. So out of
100 weeks, Tom goes to work 105 days (100 Sundays, and one Monday, one
Tuesday, etc). Hence,pr 2 = 5/105 or approximately 0.0476. The ordinary sum of
prj and pr 2 is approximately 0.5238. But since the only day on which it is true that
both the mail comes and Tom goes to work is Wednesday, pr 12 = I. But now
compare (F) with (A). In (A) osj_ 2 = 0.55 and pru = I. The jump of 0.45 in (A)
was deemed significant and so Test B correctly judged (A) to be linked. But in the
current situation with (F) the actual probability jumps the ordinary sum by even
more than 0.45 and so if the jump in (A) is significant, then so must the jump in (F)
and so (F) is once again judged to be linked.
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Now reconsider (A), but in the following circumstances. Cora, whose husband died not long ago, almost never goes into the study anymore because the
study reminds her too much of her departed husband. Hence, given that she is in
the study or in the kitchen, the probability that she is in the study is extremely low,
whereas the probability that she is in the kitchen is extremely high. Suppose then
that, given she is in either the study or the kitchen, the probability that she is in the
kitchen is 0.99. Continue to assume that the fact that she is not in the study, by
itself, only makes it I 0% likely she is in the kitchen. In this case pr1 = 0.99 and pr2
=0.1. Hence, os 1. 2 = 0.991. Butpr1. 2 = 1. 9
Now compare (A) and (F) again. The move to Test B from Test A was motivated by the claim that the jump from (F)'s ordinary sum of 0.9711 to (F)'s actual
probability of0.998, a jump of0.0269, is not a significant jump. But if a "jump" of
0.0269 is not significant, then a "jump" of0.009 is certainly not, and according to
Test B, (A), contra appearances, is convergent. Hence, either Test B misclassifies
(A) in some cases or, despite (A)'s canonically linked appearance, (A) is convergent in some cases.
Indeed, with enough ingenuity, circumstances can be made such that no matter what fixed value is deemed the minimum required for a significant jump, arguments such as (A) and (F) or (B) can be made to either both involve a significant
jump or both not involve a significant jump. Either way, either Test B misclassifies
at least one, if not both, of the canonical arguments or Test B allows at least one,
if not both, ofthe canonical arguments to be in some circumstances linked and in
some circumstances convergent. Hence, on the supposition that what counts as a
significant jump is a fixed value, Test B fails to solve the problems of Test A.
Suppose, then, that an advocate of Test B admits that what counts as a "significant jump" can vary from one set of circumstances to the next. But what,
other than a question-begging appeal to the very structure of the arguments in
question themselves, could possibly justify the required variation so that (A) always turns out linked and (F) and (B) always turn out convergent? On what
grounds could one argue that in the case of Cora being in her study only one time
out of I 00, a jump of merely 0.009 is sufficient, but in the case of Tom working
only one Saturday in I 00, a jump of 0.0269 is not? In fact, what the extreme
variability of the possible values of pr 1, pr2 , os 12 and pr 12 for (A), (B), and (F)
strongly indicates is that these values are largely independent of an argument's
structure. If true, then only by appealing to this very structure could 'significant
jump' be defined in order to give the intuitively correct answers. Indeed, if true,
we most certainly should abandon appeal to the relative values of os 12 and pr1 2 to
determine an argument's structure.
·
·
Perhaps then the problem is the definition of the ordinary sum itself. In the
conclusion of his paper, Tyaglo claims, as William Grennan hinted, that the ordinary summing equations are "only approximations to accurate formulae" and that
"correct formulae might be derived based on a relevant J.M Keynes' equation"
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(Tyaglo, 2003, 69). Let ke 12 stand for the result of Keynes' equation, in which
case Keynes' equation is, ·
ke 1.2 = Pr({C & Pl}l P2) I [ Pr({C & PI}I P2) + Pr(

{~C

& PI} I P2)]

which Tyaglo calls "Keynes' formula for a two-premise convergent argument"
(Tyaglo, 2003, 70). In other words, the result of Keynes' equation is just the
probability, given P2, of both the conclusion and PI, divided by the sum of (i) the
probability, given P2, of the conclusion and PI and (ii) the probability, given P2, of
PI and the negation ofthe conclusion.
Tyaglo's concern about using Keynes' equation is that "in a regular case this
equation includes additional unknown variables and so isn't solvable" (Tyaglo,
2003, 69). In other words, Keynes' ordinary summing equation is less likely to be
solvable than Yanal's even ifYanal's is only an approximation. Indeed, one significant practical concern with the Ordinary Summing Test is that it requires being
able to determine the conditional probabilities of (i) the conclusion given each
premise separately and (ii) the conclusion given both premises together. But in
many cases these probability values are unknown and perhaps unknowable and
merely guessing at the values is prone to yield erroneous results (See also Walton,
I996, 128).
Regardless of these practical concerns, the current issue is whether, even in
the cases in which the relevant probabilities are known, either of these equations
can be used to help determine whether an argument is linked or convergent. The
arguments of this section and section 4 above show that the ordinary summing
equations will not succeed. But if the ordinary summing equations are just approximations to Keynes' equation, then perhaps better results will be achieved if,
instead of using os 12 in the previous tests, we use ke 12 • For example, reconsider
(F) in the very first set of circumstances. Tom goes 'to work on 30 out of 100
Saturdays and 30 out of 100 Sundays and 88 out of I 00 weekdays. Hence 440 of
the 500 cases in which Tom goes to work, or 88%, are cases in which it is both a
weekday and the mail came. On only 30 of those 500 days, or 6%, is it both the
case that the mail came and it is not a weekday. Hence, ke ,, 2 = 0.88 I ( 0.88 + 0.06)
or approximately 0.936 which is indeed equal to the actual conditional probability.
So Keynes' equation, unlike the ordinary summing equation, generates the correct
result for (F).
But now reconsider (A). Given that she is not in the study, the probability that
she is both either in the kitchen or the study and not in the kitchen is 0-after all,
it is impossible that she is either in the kitchen or the study and not in the study and
not in the kitchen. But then ke 12 = Pr( {C & PI }I P2) I [ Pr( {C & PI }I P2) + 0)]
or just Pr( {C & PI }I P2) I Pr( {C & PI }I P2) which is just 1. Hence keu = pr,.Jor
(A) as well, and using ke 1.2 does not distinguish (A) from (F).
The real problem with Keynes' formula is that, contra Tyaglo, the equation is
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not Keynes' equation for convergent arguments, but rather his equation for calculating the probability of a conclusion given any two premises whatsoever (Keynes,
I962, I49-I50). In other words, Keynes is providing a general formula for calculatingpr1.2 given any conclusion and any two premises. But if ke 1.2 just is pr 1.r then
ke 1. 2 will never differ from pr 1. 2 and we certainly cannot use ke 1. 2 to demarcate
linked from convergent arguments, because comparing the result of Keynes' formula with pr 1. 2 does not distinguish any arguments whatsoever.

6. Conclusion
While Walton advocates his own version of the Ordinary Summing Test, he admits
that perhaps "we have not yet discovered the key counterexample that refutes the
[Ordinary Summing Test] or shows it to be problematic" (Walton, 144). Whether
any of the examples given here constitute by themselves a key counterexample, I
do not know. But what all the examples together show is that no version of the
Ordinary Summing Test successfully demarcates all canonical linked arguments
from all canonical convergent arguments. Indeed, it appears that our judgements
concerning the obvious cases are independent of the values of the conditional
probabilities appealed to in the Tests. It is our intuitions that make us believe there
is a distinction to be made in the first place and so given the choice between
following the Test or sticking with our intuitions, we should stick with our intuitions.
If the Ordinary Summing Test is unsuccessful, then no generalization of it will be
successful either. 10

Appendix One
Prove: If pr 1•2.J == os I,l,J and none of pr 1 , pr 2 , and prJ is equal to I, then the pattern
is not any of (ii)-(iv).
Assume that none of the premises is alone sufficient for the conclusion, i.e.,
pr 1 * I, pr 2 * I and prJ* I. Assume pr 1. 2.J ==os 1. 2.J. Now suppose (iv) is the correct
pattern.
(I) os 12 J == os 12 +(1 - os 12 ) prJ" Since, by C2, the order of ordinary summing
does not ~·atter, o~ 1 2 J also equals prJ+ (I - pr;) os 1 r [The equivalence of os 1 2 +(I
- os 1.2 ) prJ and prJ+ (I- pr;) os 1.2 can be quickly ve.rified by some simple algebra.]
Hence pr 1. 2.J ==prJ+ (1 - pr;) os 1.r
(II) Consider the two-premise argument whose first premise is just the
conjunction of PI and P2, viz.:
(X)
PI& P2, P3 I C.
The probability ofC given both PI & P2 and P3 is the same as the probability
ofC given PI, P2 and P3, i.e.,pr 1. 2.J. Also, the probability ofthe conclusion given
PI & P2 is exactly the same as the conditional probability ofC given PI and P2 as
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separate premises, viz., pr,.r The probability of the conclusion given P3 is just
pr3. Hence the ordinary sum of (X) is equal to pr 1.2 + (1 - pr 1.2) pr3. Again by C2
this is the same as pr3 + (1 - pr) pr/,2' Since (X) is convergent, pr 1. 2. 3 is equal to
the ordinary sum. Hence, pr 1•2. 3 = pr 3 + (1 - pr) pr 1.2 •
(III) By the result in (I) pr 1. 2.3 = pr3 + (1 - pr) os 1.r But by the result in (II), pr1. 2•3
is also equal to pr3 + (1 - pr) pr 1.r Hence, by the transitivity of identity pr3 + (1 pr) pr 1•2 = pr3 + ( 1 - pr) os 1.r Subtract pr3 from both sides. Hence, (1 - pr 3 ) pr1•2
= (1- pr3 ) os,.r Sincepr3 is at most 1 and at leastO, and by supposition '•1, l-pr 3
is not 0. Hence, we can divide both sides by 1- prr Hence pr 1.2 = os,.r But since,
in pattern (iv), Pl and P2 are linked, given the Ordinary Summing Test, pr 1.2 >
os J.r Hence, given our two initial assumptions, if the pattern is (iv) pr 1.2 is both
equal to and greater than os 1 2 • This is impossible. Hence, the pattern cannot be
(iv). By parallel reasoning the pattern cannot be (ii) or (iii). Hence, if pr 1. 2. 3 =
os 1 2 3 and none of pr1 , prr and pr 3 are equal to 1, then the pattern is not any of
(ii}-(iv). QED

Appendix Two
The proof of this claim proceeds by mathematical induction.
Base Clause: If neither pr1 = 1 nor pr 2 = 1, then os 1.2 < 1.
Suppose neither pr1 = 1 nor pr2 = 1, but os 1. 2 = 1. Since os 1. 2 = pr 1 + (1 - pr 1)
pr 2 , 1 = pr 1 + (1- pr 1) prr Subtract pr 1 from both sides. Hence 1- pr 1 = (1- pr)
prr If we divide both sides by 1 - pr 1 we get the result that pr2 = 1, which
contradicts our initial assumption. Hence we cannot divide by 1 - pr 1, in which
case 1 - pr 1 = 0, in which case, contra our initial assumption pr 1 = 1. Hence, if
neither pr 1 = 1 nor pr2= 1, then os 1.2 * 1. Since os 1.2 must be between 0 and 1, os 1.2
<1.
Induction Clause: Provided that if for all k, prk * 1, then os J..... k <1, then if for all
k+l,prk+J*l, then os 1.... k+J <1.
Suppose (i) if for all k, prk * 1, then os 1 k <1, and (ii) for all k+ 1, prk+J * 1.
Suppose, however, that os 1. . k+J = 1. Since ;;J .... k+J = os 1.. ,k + (1- os 1... k)prk+J' then
1 = os 1 k + ( 1- os 1 k)prk+r Hence, 1- os 1 k = (1- os, J prk+r If we divide
both Sid~S by l-OS I, .~''We get prk+l = 1 Which ~OntradictS OUr SUppositiOn that for
all k+ 1, prk+J * 1. Hence, we cannot divide both sides by l-os J..... k' which means los J..... kmust equal 0. Hence, 1 = os l, .... k' But given that for all k, prk * 1, and supposition
(i), os ,, .... k <1. os J..... k cannot be both equal to and less than 1. Hence, the supposition
that os 1.. k+J =1 must be wrong given suppositions (i) and (ii). os 1... k+J must be
between 1 and 0 and since it is not 1, must be less than 1. Hence, provided that
(i), then given that (ii), os, .. k+J <1. QED
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Notes
1 Note that Yanal's 1991 (A) and (B) are not quite the same as his 2003 (A) and (B). I have opted
for the latter because, unlike his 1991 examples, Yanal provides ordinary summing calculations
for both his 2003 examples.
2 Tyaglo uses the standard p(CjP I ,P2) and p(CJPI ,P2,P3) notation to articulate Yanal 's formula
and its generalizations. The problem is that p(CJPI ,P2) literally means the actual probability of
the conclusion given the two premises, i.e., what I call pr 1.2 , which, in most cases, is not the
ordinary sum of p(CJP I) and p(CjP2). But the generalized ordinary sums are recursive on
previous ordinary sums, not the previous actual probabilities.
3 Vorobej (1995) also articulates a taxonomy involving convergent, linked, and hybrid arguments.
However, other than Vorobej's "convergent" being the same as my "purely convergent" our
taxonomies do not correspond.
4
Given that the numbering of premises is irrelevant, patterns (ii)- (iv) are equivalent in the sense
that any argument that is an example of one ofthose patterns, through a simple renumbering of
the premises, can be made to be an example of either of the others.
5 The probability assignments here assume that I am correct 75% of the time with respect to
what I see relative to her being or not being in the kitchen. If we drop the relative to her being
or not being in the kitchen, determining how the two premises interact is extremely difficult, if
not impossible. For example, ifl saw her heading for the bedroom and she's in the study, I am
in one sense wrong about what I saw. But since seeing her head for the bedroom is also a case of
seeing her not heading toward the kitchen and she is in fact not in the kitchen it is also a case in
which I am right about what I saw.
6
P and Q are stochastically independent iffpr(PIQ) = pr(P). In other words, the fact that Q has
no bearing on the probability ofP (and vice versa). The General Disjunction Rule is pr(P v Q)
= pr(P ) + pr(Q) - pr(P & Q ). But by the Special Conjunction Rule, when P and Q are
stochastically independent, pr(P & Q) = pr(P) x pr(Q) (Skyrms, 2000, 115, 121-122).
7 Describing part of his earliest version of the distinction, Yanal writes "Reasons are DEPENDENT
when together they make the overall strength of the argument MUCH GREATER than they
would considered separately" (1988, 42). In Yanal 1991 and 2003, the "much greater than"
locution disappears. Walton quotes Yanal's 1988 description, but ultimately adopts the locution
"significantly greater" for his version ofYanal's test.
8
Admittedly, Walton writes,

What is most important in judging an individual case is the structure of the argument,
the indicator-words, and the evaluator's interpretation of how the argument is being
used, in the context of dialogue, to make a point. In most cases, these three indicators
are the main basis for making a judgement, and we may have no need at all to apply the
Degree Supp. test. The test shouid be seen as more of an adjunct indicator that can be
applied if these other indicators are not very decisive (I 81 ).

But the problem for the Degree Supp. test, i.e., the Ordinary Summing Test and its variants, is
that it misclassifies canonical cases of linked and convergent arguments. But canonical cases are
presumably canonical because they are unambiguous with respect to the primary evidence, i.e.,
with respect to their overt scheme, indicator words, and use. But if the Test misclassifies in the
cases in which the primary evidence is unambiguous, why should we suddenly rely on the test
to provide the correct answer when the primary evidence is ambiguous?
9
Walton (1996, 129) also acknowledges the existence of these sorts of problematic cases for
classifying (A).
10 Ancestors of parts of this paper, most especially parts of section 4 and section 2, constitute
parts ofGoddu 2003, which is commentary on Yanal2003 both of which were presented at the
2003 Informal Logic@25 Conference at Windsor, Ontario.
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